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  1Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment 
 
 
Societies and organizations experience conflicts between desires to attend to the 
needs of their weaker members, the necessity of providing incentives for generating 
output, and concerns that reward for effort and contribution of resources be fairly 
assigned. When weighing these concerns of altruism, incentives and fairness, individuals 
also consider their self-interest, which is likely to be aligned with some but not all of 
these factors. At the macro level, the trade-offs in question are navigated, for instance, by 
determining levels of provision of social benefits and the extent and progressivity of 
taxation (Okun, 1975; Piketty, 1995; Benabou, 2000). At the micro level, they play out in 
the negotiation of responsibilities and sharing of consumption in households (Lundberg 
and Pollak, 1996), and in determination of how differentiated rewards are in 
organizations (Lazear, 1989; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994; Irlenbusch and Ruchala, 
2008).  
In a business enterprise, rewards tend to be differentiated partly  to induce 
individuals to exert greater effort and partly because each contributor to the team effort 
has the power to exit if paid less than her best outside option, which may vary from one 
employee to another. Yet there are also numerous constraints on differentiation of 
reward. Firm-specific human capital drives a wedge between an employee’s marginal 
value to her employer and the outside value of her current skill set, generating a quasi-
rent the distribution of which is subject to managerial discretion (Williamson et al., 
1975). To reduce the danger of invidious comparisons, firms pay workers with similar 
job descriptions and seniority similar amounts when indications of differences in 
productivity are not easily verifiable (Baker et al., 1988). In some environments, there 
may be social or cultural constraints on the maximum gaps between employees at 
different levels, which may help to explain why the pay differential between top 
managers and non-managerial employees varies considerably among countries (Abowd 
and Bognanno, 1995). Finally, many companies implement profit-sharing arrangements 
partly to encourage helping behaviors among their employees (Kruse, 1992; Bhargava, 
1994; Che and Yoo, 2001). 
  2We study what is perhaps the most fundamental conflict in economic decision-
making, i.e. the trade-off between equality, equity and incentives, in a stylized 
experimental environment that reflects the main elements of the problem relevant to both 
firm and society levels. The paper proposes a new experimental setup that captures this 
trade-off in a general and transparent way by nesting the standard linear voluntary 
contributions mechanism (VCM) or public goods game (see Ledyard, 1995, for an early 
overview, and Zelmer, 2003, for a meta-study) in a more universal but straightforward 
incentive framework. More specifically, in our experiment a subject is paired with two 
others and makes a series of fifteen decisions on how much of an endowment of tokens to 
contribute to a group project and how much to retain as private income. Contributions to 
the group project are scaled up, mimicking a team production opportunity with a 
productivity advantage over a private one. What makes our setup new compared to the 
existing literature and what allows studying the trade-offs mentioned above explicitly is 
the combination of two features. First, the three group members have unequal 
endowments
1 and, second, the money generated by the team can be (i) divided up 
equally, (ii) in proportion to amounts contributed, or (iii) by any combination of the equal 
and the proportional distribution rules. With equal distribution, we have a division 
scheme that provides no incentive for a maximizer of private earnings to contribute but 
that would render earnings fully equal with at least some gain to all, were all to cooperate 
completely. With division of team output by contributions, in contrast, there is a 
straightforward incentive for each to contribute their entire endowment, but earnings are 
highly unequal. In our experiment, we make the scaling factor of the public good large 
enough so that over a considerable range of intermediate division settings incentives to 
contribute remain strong, yet earnings are somewhat equalized, potentially pleasing some 
and displeasing other group members. 
We study contribution responses to varying division parameters in four conditions 
constituting a 2x2 factorial experimental design. In two treatments, we allow subjects to 
determine the setting of the division parameter by majority vote, while in two others the 
                                                 
1 There are several examples of public goods games in the literature that implement unequal endowments: 
e.g. Chan et al. (1996, 1999), van Dijk et al. (2002), Cherry et al. (2005), Buckley and Croson (2006), and 
Sadrieh and Verbon (2006). None of them studies the trade-off between incentives and equality. 
  3parameter is set exogenously, tracking the settings of the voting groups so that we can 
examine the response of contributions to changes in incentives free of strategic 
motivation to influence voting. The other dimension of variation that we study concerns 
the origin of the inequality of endowments. We implement two treatments in which 
unequal endowments are assigned randomly and two in which the endowments are 
earned by performance on a task (a quiz) that may create feelings of entitlement over the 
endowment (see, for instance, Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985, Gächter and Riedl, 2005). This 
allows us to investigate whether voting and responses to incentives are influenced by 
differing perspectives regarding the fairness of the inequalities within the group. 
For treatments in which the division parameter is determined by voting, our setup is 
predicted to foster a struggle in which selfish low and selfish high endowment subjects 
attempt to influence the votes of pivotal middle endowment subjects towards their 
opposing interests. Middle endowment subjects should be indifferent over a wide range 
of parameter values unless they have preferences over equality or fairness, or if high or 
low endowment subjects succeed in credibly signaling that their willingness to contribute 
depends on the parameter in a manner pertinent to middle endowment subjects’ self-
interest. Observations with the parameter exogenous permit testing of whether seemingly 
strategic behaviors in the voting treatments are in fact strategically motivated. And if 
earned endowments confer entitlement, pro-egalitarian middle endowment subjects will 
display less concern with equality in the quiz treatment. High and low endowment 
subjects’ contribution decisions may also be influenced by preferences for equality, 
which may likewise be lessened by entitlement concern when present, since earned 
inequalities would cause equality and equity to cut in opposing directions, in our setup. 
Our experiment provides a number of results. First, subjects respond to the strength 
of incentives in a roughly continuous fashion, rather than jumping from zero 
contributions when their marginal return for contributing is below unity to full 
contributions when it exceeds that threshold, as standard theory would predict. This is 
true of subjects in each endowment class, and thus appears to stem from bounded 
rationality rather than from concerns about equality or inequality. Second, high and low 
endowment subjects’ votes are largely predictable from self-interest, with the former 
mostly favoring payment proportionate to contributions and the latter favoring more 
  4equal payment. Third, subjects’ votes appear to be sophisticated, taking into account the 
impacts of the distribution parameter on contributions as observed in their groups—that 
is, they respond to others’ responses to incentives in a manner that is selfishly rational on 
the margin. Fourth, subjects’ contributions are influenced by strategic considerations: low 
endowment subjects contribute more at marginal returns below one when the division is 
determined by vote, presumably to signal willingness to cooperate despite low incentive. 
High endowment subjects influence groups’ choices of the division parameter by 
withholding contributions when it is relatively low even though contributing the full 
endowment maximizes their immediate payoff. 
Despite the strong role of self-interest suggested by these findings, our results also 
include evidence of concerns over inequality and fairness. First, both high and middle 
endowment subjects sometimes vote for redistribution, and there is evidence that votes 
are significantly preference-based, with female subjects and those obtaining more 
cooperative scores in a Ring Test (see Offerman et al., 1996, for an application in 
economics) selecting significantly more equal parameters. The same subjects also 
contribute more unconditionally and are less responsive to incentive changes. Second, 
subjects display greater preference for equality when inequalities are arbitrary than when 
they are earned by task performance, since low and high endowment subjects are 
observed to vote for more equality following an otherwise identical history if 
endowments were not earned. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The following section provides 
a short overview of the related literature. Section 2 describes our experimental design and 
our theoretical predictions in greater detail. In Section 3, our results are represented in 
several analytical steps, and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
1. Literature 
The economics literature on inequality ranges from the philosophical and 
theoretical (Sen, 1997) to work on measurement (Shorrocks, 1983), relationship to 
economic growth (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), and political 
economy (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou, 2000; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). While 
hypothetically any desired income distribution can be achieved without efficiency loss by 
  5a suitable lump-sum transfer of assets, and while opportunities to promote both equity 
and efficiency occur in some contexts, trade-offs between the need for incentives that 
reward potentially unequal contributions, and the desire to avoid inequalities and the 
associated envy, social divisions, and perceptions of injustice, are a ubiquitous fact of 
economic life. 
Disinterested concern with inequality is not always fully separable from self-
interest. The poor and middle income may favor redistribution out of entirely selfish 
motives (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), and some redistribution may also be favored by the 
rich out of enlightened self-interest (Grossman, 1995). Nevertheless, models that include 
preferences to reduce inequality as an end in itself have had success in explaining some 
observations that appear to be behavioral anomalies from the viewpoint of standard 
theory. In a much-cited paper, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose a model in which 
individuals get utility from their own income, may get disutility from earning less than 
others (disadvantageous inequality), and may also get disutility from earning more than 
others (advantageous inequality), with the weight on advantageous inequality constrained 
to be no larger than that on disadvantageous inequality. This can explain, among other 
things, the common rejection of positive but low offers in the ultimatum game (Güth et 
al., 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995). However, subjects are sometimes willing to 
sacrifice at least small amounts to give large benefits to advantaged others, which 
Charness and Rabin (2002) see as illustrating a positive weight placed on aggregate 
social welfare.
2 
At the level of the society, progressive taxation and distribution of welfare 
benefits are often rhetorically asserted to reflect shared social values, although their 
selection by electorates is at least in part a natural outgrowth of the right-skewedness of 
market income distributions. Experiments in which subjects choose among different 
                                                 
2 In their appendix, Charness and Rabin present a more elaborate utility function with a social welfare 
component that can put varying weights on both aggregate earnings and the earnings of the lowest earner. 
Since it is difficult to distinguish between inequality aversion and concern for the least well off (the 
Rawlsian motive) in our experimental design, we will consider the motive for redistributing to the poorest 
subject to be the first although it could as easily be the second. Considerations of reciprocity, discussed in 
Charness and Rabin and other papers on other-regarding preferences, will be referred to when explaining 
cooperation in the VCM but are of second-order importance to our focus on distributive choice. 
  6income distributions for hypothetical societies without direct payoff consequences 
(Amiel et al., 1999, Johanssen-Stenman et al., 2002) suggest a preference for more equal 
distributions, and experiments in which similar decisions have a direct payoff 
consequence to the chooser (Ackert, et al., 2007; Beckman et al., 2004; Schmidt et al., 
2009) also show some willingness to pay to achieve greater equality via taxation. 
Concerns for fairness sometimes overlap but at other times pull against desires for 
equality or concern for the least well off. Experimental economists including Hoffman 
and Spitzer (1985) and Burrows and Loomes (1994) find that subjects place less weight 
on equality per se when unequal incomes are perceived to have been earned, and Fong 
(2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and others provide evidence that support for 
redistribution depends on perceptions of fairness.
3 In their laboratory experiment on 
redistributive taxation, Durante and Putterman (2009) find that subjects desire 
significantly less redistribution when differences are earned by performance on a quiz or 
game of skill, although the difference is considerably greater among male than among 
female subjects. 
The literature on incentives in organizations includes among its themes the idea 
that there must be at least potential inequality of earnings (members of a team cannot 
simply divide their net product by fixed shares) if efficient effort levels are to be elicited 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982; Holmström and Milgrom, 1994). 
However, inducing maximum competition among team members might mean forgoing 
important benefits from helping behaviors and mutual monitoring, so that basing some 
pay on group rather than individual performance may be a more efficient approach (Aoki, 
1984; Itoh, 1992). In his seminal paper on gift exchange in the employment relationship, 
Akerlof (1982) hypothesized that an employer might avoid differentiating pay among 
similar workers as a form of generosity that more capable workers would reward with 
greater effort. 
The mixing of equal pay and pay-for-effort used in the experiment that follows 
was first used in a model of cooperatives by Sen (1966). Sen showed that with 
diminishing returns and thus a decreasing marginal product of labor, payment strictly 
                                                 
3 There is also an experimental literature on competing fairness ideals; see, for example, Cappelen et al. 
(2010). 
  7proportional to contribution would induce socially excessive effort. Hence, introducing a 
degree of equalization served as an optimal corrective.
4 Sen’s analysis also showed that 
complete equality of distribution would generate a low effort equilibrium unless the team 
members’ preferences towards one another were highly altruistic. 
The undermining of incentives in a team by egalitarian output sharing à la Sen 
(1966) or Holmström (1982) has been studied in the laboratory – most often without 
recognizing this linkage – in the form of the VCM, which in its simplest form asks n > 2 
subjects to allocate endowments of equal size between a group project having a linear 
technology with marginal social return n > R > 1 and private projects with marginal 
return 1. Since the group members share the group project’s output without regard to 
contribution, each one’s marginal private return to contributing is 0 < R/n < 1. Hence, the 
privately optimal choice for each is to engage in the private activity only (Isaac and 
Walker, 1988; Andreoni, 1988; Ledyard, 1995). While actual experimental results 
disconfirm the prediction of full free riding, with average initial contributions to the 
group project clustering around 50% of endowments, subjects gradually approach a free-
riding equilibrium with repetition. Despite important evidence that social preferences 
such as altruism, warm-glow, and reciprocity (conditional cooperation) explain some 
contributions (Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Anderson et al., 1998; 
Fischbacher et al., 2001; Croson, 2007; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), the decay of 
contributions over time in the absence of punishment opportunities or other added 
mechanisms remains the standard finding. In other words, the association of a severe free 
riding problem with the basic design of the VCM is uncontroversial. 
In what follows, we re-conceptualize the VCM as the egalitarian end of an array 
of incentive schemes in which the return from allocations to the group project grows by 
steps from R/n < 1 (the VCM with its free-riding incentives) to R > 1 (an individually 
profitable opportunity). The nesting of the VCM in such an array of incentive schemes is 
                                                 
4 The model’s excessive effort problem, resulting from the link between pay and labor’s average product 
(APL) when APL > MPL (marginal product of labor), appears unlikely to have existed in actual 
cooperatives due to imperfect observability of individual effort. More important for present purposes, the 
problem has no direct counterpart in our experiment because we impose a constant marginal product and 
thus APL = MPL. 
  8also used in Grosse et al. (2010), but in their model VCM incentives represent a lack of 
monitoring, not a preference for egalitarian distribution. Whereas Grosse et al.’s subjects 
face the problem of free-riding incentives if they fail to achieve mutual monitoring or 
bring in a specialist monitor as suggested by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), subjects in the 
present paper’s endogenous parameter treatments experience or evade free-riding 
incentives as a function of voting choices potentially influenced by self-interest, 
egalitarian sentiments, and conceptions of fairness. 
 
 
2. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
2.1 Basic setup 
We conducted two sessions of each of four treatments (see Table 1). In each 
treatment, 36 subjects are randomly assigned to fixed groups of 3 who remain anonymous 
to one another, in two sessions of 18 subjects each. In each group, one subject has an 
endowment of 5 tokens, a second an endowment of 10 tokens, and a third an endowment 
of 15 tokens, with a given subject receiving the same endowment in each of 15 periods of 
play, a finitely repeated design. In each period, subjects must decide how many tokens to 
put in the group project, with the remainder being placed in a private account. In a given 
period, subject i earns 
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where Ei is i’s endowment (5, 10 or 15), Ci is his or her contribution to the group project 
(an integer),   is the sum of the three contributions in a given period, j = l, m, 
h represents the low, middle, and high endowment subjects respectively, 1 < R < 3 is the 
scaling factor, and α ((1 – α)) is the share of group output distributed on the basis of 
contributions (equally). In the experiment,
  
3
1 j j C C
} 1 ,..., 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 0 {   , and we set R = 2, so 
equation (1) becomes 
i i i i C C C E y 2
3
2
) 1 ( ) (         (1’) 
  9This choice of parameters means that the marginal return from contributing to the 
group project, , is less than 1 when α < 0.25 and greater than 1 when α > 0.25. If 
all subjects are strictly self-interested, perfectly rational, and have common knowledge of 
this, then contributions should be zero and earnings 5, 10 and 15, respectively, when α = 
0, 0.1 or 0.2. Under the same assumptions, contributions should be equal to endowments 
when α ≥ 0.3, with earnings out of the fixed total of 60 varying from a relatively equal 
17, 20, and 23 when α = 0.3 to their most unequal values of 10, 20 and 30 when α = 1. 
This wide scope for equalization without in theory undermining incentives creates a 
broad space for expression of distributive preferences, distributional conflict, and 
“posturing” so as to influence voting outcomes. 
i i C y   /
To be sure, endowments such that the median endowment was below the average 
would generate a right-skewed earnings distribution more like that commonly observed at 
the macro political level, and are thus worth investigating in future research. However, 
the symmetrically distributed endowments in our design make it easier to identify the 
effects of redistributive preferences and countervailing incentive concerns, since this 
symmetry causes each group’s median voter to have no personal stake in how income is 
divided, apart from such concerns.  
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
In the Quiz-Vote (henceforth also QV) and Quiz-Exogenous (QE) treatments, 
subjects first complete a twenty-minute general knowledge quiz before being assigned to 
the low, middle or high endowment level based on their performance. In QE, they then 
proceed to make fifteen contribution decisions, each time with an α-value that is 
exogenous to them being announced at the beginning of the period, and with the 
decisions and earnings of all subjects being announced at the end of the period. The 
Random-Exogenous (RE) treatment is like the QE treatment except that there is no quiz 
and the endowment levels are assigned randomly. In the QV and Random-Vote (RV) 
treatments, subjects specify the value of α that they favor at the beginning of each period 
and are then shown the value selected by the group—the median value among the three 
  10submitted—before proceeding to make their contribution decisions.
5 The RV treatment 
differs from QV but resembles RE in that there is no quiz and endowments are assigned 
randomly. To facilitate testing of whether exogeneity of α influences contribution 
decisions, we match each RV-treatment group to an RE group and assign the latter the 
precise sequence of α’s selected by voting in the former, although RE subjects are not 
informed that this is what determines α.
6 Each QE-treatment group is likewise assigned 
the sequence of α’s determined by the median voter in a counterpart QV group. Subjects 
knew in advance that there would be exactly 15 periods of play, each subject knew that 
his or her endowment and group composition would not change, and in the QV and QE 
treatments subjects knew that their performance on the quiz would determine their 
endowment. 
 
2.2 Theoretical predictions 
2.2.1 Full rationality and self-interest 
Rational payoff-maximizing subjects who know that all are of the same type would 
select Ci = 0 in all periods in which α ≤ 0.2 and Ci = Ei (= 5, 10 or 15) in all periods in 
which  α  ≥ 0.3. Thus, standard economic theory gives our first (non-behavioral) 
hypothesis: 
 
Hn.1: Ci = 0, Ei as α ≤ 0.25, α ≥ 0.25. 
 
                                                 
5 The median vote is often used in experiments as a representation of a democratic decision in view of the 
well-known median-voter theorem in public choice theory, since explicit competition among proposals 
would be time-consuming. The outcome of a multi-stage competition would also be sensitive to procedural 
details, and thus we make no claim that the median position represents a majority view in any strict sense.  
Note that individual votes were not reported to the group, so there was no way to use votes to convey 
individual preferences. 
6 They were simply told that the relevant α-value for a specific period would be announced at its beginning 
and that it would always come from the set   1 ,..., 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 , 0 . Details are provided in the experimental 
instructions in Appendix C. 
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likewise assume that Ci = 0 for all i when α ≤ 0.2 and C i = Ei for all i for α ≥ 0.3. Given 
this, if it were assumed that subjects simply voted their interest without consideration of 
how others might vote, low endowment subjects would vote for α = 0.3, which 
maximizes their earnings at 17, high endowment subjects would vote for α = 1, which 
maximizes their earnings at 30, and middle endowment subjects would be indifferent 
between the eight values of α from 0.3 to 1, since they earn 20, regardless. Assuming that 
the middle endowment subjects choose randomly among these values, α would thus vary 
randomly over the 0.3-to-1 range, and expected incomes would be mid-way between the 
most and least equal sets reported above, i.e. 13.5, 20 and 26.5. When taking others’ 
expected votes into account, both high and low endowment subjects can reason that the 
middle endowment subject’s voted α – call it αm – will be decisive. A high endowment 
subject has no reason to favor one value over another in the interval αm ≤ α ≤ 1, but with 
no way to anticipate what αm will be in a given period, a high endowment voter should 
always choose the weakly dominant strategy of voting for α = 1.
7 The position of the low 
endowment subject, who would likewise be indifferent among values of α in the interval 
0.3 ≤ α ≤ αm, is slightly different, because she can safely vote for α = 0, 0.1, 0.2 or 0.3 
without fear of raising α above her preferred value (0.3). Hypothesis Hn.2 summarizes 
these considerations. 
 
Hn.2: High endowment subjects always vote for α = 1.0, middle endowment 
subjects distribute their votes randomly for α-values in the interval from 0.3 to 
1.0, and low endowment subjects choose any  ] 3 . 0 ; 0 [   . Thus, the median vote 
is always cast by the subject with the middle endowment. 
 
2.2.2 Heterogeneous (social) preferences 
We consider two forms of social preferences that may cause subjects’ behaviors to 
deviate from what would maximize their own pay-offs. These are (a) inequality aversion, 
and (b) concerns with equity, or respect for “earned” inequalities. The presence and 
                                                 
7 The trembling hand perfection argument (Selten, 1975) can also be used to motivate an αh = 1 prediction. 
  12weight placed on each preference may vary among individuals and when present may 
affect both contribution and voting choices. 
With regard to (a), suppose that each subject’s utility takes the form modeled by 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), as described in Section 1. For our high endowment subjects, 
only advantageous inequality is of potential concern, for low ones only disadvantageous 
inequality, and for middle ones, both advantageous and disadvantageous inequalities are 
potential concerns. If subjects vote on our parameter α assuming that inequality aversion 
has no first-order effect on contributions, inequality aversion would not alter the vote of a 
low endowment subject, who in the absence of social preferences already votes for α ≤ 
0.3. But both middle and high endowment subjects would vote for lower values of α than 
otherwise if they are sufficiently inequality averse. Indeed, since no income sacrifice is 
required of her under these assumptions, a middle endowment subject with any degree of 
inequality aversion would vote for α = 0.3, eliminating both most advantageous and most 
disadvantageous inequality in a single stroke. A high endowment subject, in contrast, 
incurs a loss of own income to reduce only advantageous inequalities. Hence, assuming 
similar distributions of inequality aversion in high and middle endowment subjects, we 
should expect more downward bias in votes for α due to inequality aversion on the parts 
of middle than of high endowment subjects.
8 
Factor (b), the desire of some subjects that “earned” inequalities not be unfairly 
eliminated, can be present – in our QV treatment – in the same individuals who are 
inequality averse, or by itself. If present alone, this equity concern will have no influence 
on the votes of high endowment subjects (who select α = 1 in any case), may cause 
middle-endowment subjects to bias their votes upwards within the 0.3 ≤ α ≤ 1 range, and 
may lead some low-endowment subjects to vote, contrary to their own interest, for α > 
                                                 
8 A more complete analysis requires considering the possible effects of inequality aversion on 
contributions. In particular, sufficiently inequality-averse high endowment subjects would contribute to the 
group project even at low levels of α so as to reduce advantageous inequality, and inequality-averse middle 
endowment subjects might do so if they assumed that high endowment subjects do. These changes in the 
relationship between α and contributions could in turn affect voting, but are expected to be of second-order 
importance only. 
  130.3. For subjects having both equality and equity preferences, the prediction is one of 
favoring higher values of α in the QV than in the RV treatment. 
Assuming substantial numbers of subjects who are averse to inequalities, averse to 
equalizing earned inequalities, or both, we make the following behavioral predictions: 
 
Hb.1. Middle and low endowment subjects will on average vote for lower α in 
the RV than in the QV treatment. Some high endowment subjects will vote for α 
< 1, and more high endowment subjects will do so, voting for lower values of α, 
in the RV than in the QV treatment. 
 
2.2.3 Strategic considerations 
There are several strategic, i.e. reputational, and preference-based reasons why 
individuals may choose contributions other than those that are statically payoff-
maximizing for them. In the voting treatments subjects may use their choices of Ci to 
signal willingness or unwillingness to contribute at given α in order to influence others’ 
subsequent votes. And if subjects’ utilities are interdependent, positive or negative 
concern for others can influence contributions even in the non-voting treatments, since 
one’s contribution affects one’s group-mates earnings whenever α < 1. 
With respect to strategy, high endowment subjects who seek to maximize their 
payoffs would want, if possible, to influence the middle endowment subjects to vote for 
higher values of α. A behaviorally realistic scenario would be that the high endowment 
subjects might (except in the last period) reduce Ch when α is in the low end of the 0.3-to-
1 range, even though they incur a cost in short-run earnings, in order to signal their 
displeasure with the low α-value. If there were truly common knowledge of full 
rationality and of utilities depending on payoffs only, such moves would be pointless, 
because the subjects could not credibly threaten to hold Ch < 15 in the last period, 
whereupon setting Ch < 15 in the next-to-last period will also have no effect, and so forth. 
Realistically, however, subjects may not be sure of others’ types, and there may exist 
subjects with, for example, a “taste for distributive justice” sufficiently strong to willingly 
incur a payoff loss as a cost for signaling their preference, so Ch < 15 seems a likely 
possibility when α is low, at least in early periods of the RV and especially (assuming 
  14some inequality and inequity aversion) the QV treatment. That Ch  will be lower in 
treatments with voting than in those without for given values of α that exceed 0.25 but are 
not too far above 0.3 is our second behavioral prediction for the experiment.
9 
 
Hb.2. High endowment subjects will contribute less in the voting than in the 
non-voting treatments when 0.3 ≤ α < 1, with contributions that are lower the 
lower is α and the earlier is the period. 
 
Contrary to the standard theory’s prediction that Ci = 0 in all periods in which α = 0, 
0.1 or 0.2, subjects who favor greater equality either for self-interest or for inequality-
aversion reasons may contribute to the group project despite such low values of α, in an 
effort to make equality more palatable and to moderate the equality-efficiency trade-off. 
Low endowment subjects, especially, are predicted to contribute more of their 
endowments than others when α = 0, 0.1 or 0.2 and α is determined by vote, since this 
could reduce the costliness of low α as perceived by other group members thereby 
leading them to vote for such values in future periods. Inequality-averse middle and high 
endowment subjects may also contribute when α = 0, 0.1 or 0.2, especially in the RV 
treatment, where inequalities are unearned and contributions may influence subsequent 
votes. For the same reason, inequality-averse high endowment subjects will engage in no 
or at least in less strategic withholding of contributions when 0.3 ≤ α < 1. 
 
Hb.3.  Low endowment subjects and inequality-averse middle and high 
endowment subjects will contribute positive amounts when α ≤ 0.2 and α is 
determined by vote, so as to encourage further votes for lower values of α, and 
the extent of this behavior will be greatest in the RV treatment. Inequality-
averse high endowment subjects will also engage in less strategic withholding 
of contributions than others with high endowment when 0.3 ≤ α < 1. 
 
                                                 
9 Low endowment subjects could conversely withhold contributions to try to sway the middle endowment 
subject’s vote when α is high. 
  15Note that the tendency of contributions to respond to changes in the marginal 
incentives continuously rather than with a discrete jump (see Isaac and Walker, 1988, for 
systematic evidence on this relation) means that the predictions of Hb.3 must be tested 
carefully, since there can be positive contributions at α ≤ 0.2 independent of the desire to 
influence votes. 
 
2.3 Laboratory protocol 
The computerized experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
A total of 144 participants (36 for each of the treatments), who were invited by using the 
software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), took part in the eight sessions of the experiment (two 
per treatment), all of them being undergraduate students with different study 
backgrounds. 
Sessions proceeded in the following way: Upon entering the laboratory, participants 
were randomly assigned to cubicles and provided with written instructions (see Appendix 
C) for the first part of the experiment, i.e. the Ring-test.
10 The instructions were read out 
aloud by the experimenter. Subjects knew that there will be a second part of the 
experiment and that it will be unrelated to the first part. Upon completion of the first part, 
the instructions for the second part were handed out and read aloud. Participants were 
then asked to answer a set of twelve control questions to make sure that the rules of the 
game had been fully understood. Any incorrect entries were corrected and all remaining 
questions were clarified before the second part commenced. In the treatments with the 
quiz, subjects began this part with the trivia questions that, then, determined the 
endowment of a subject throughout the second part of the experiment. Treatments 
without the quiz started with the random assignment of endowments. When taking the 
                                                 
10 In this fully incentivized test, subjects have to make binary choices in 24 different allocation tasks (see 
Appendix D). In each task, a subject has to choose among two alternative ways of allocating money to 
herself and a recipient. Adding up the 24 decisions yields a total sum of money allocated to oneself (x-
amount) and to the recipient (y-amount). From the ratio (x/y) one can calculate a subject’s social 
orientation, indicated by a vector , which can then be classified into any of eight categories: individualism, 
altruism, cooperation, competition, martyrdom, masochism, sadomasochism, and aggression. See Offerman 
et al. (1996) or Brosig (2002) for further details on the Ring-test. 
  16quiz subjects knew the details of the game to commence after the quiz, and they knew 
that they were already randomly assigned to a three-person group and that the member 
with the most correct answers would become the high endowment subject, the member 
with the second-most correct answers the middle endowment subject, and the member 
with the fewest correct answers the low endowment subject. 
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about all individual contributions 
within their groups linked to IDs and their own period incomes in tokens as well as the 
individual period income in tokens of the other two group members. After 15 periods, the 
experiment ended, subjects filled out a brief questionnaire (from which we extract the 
gender information used later), and subjects were paid out privately and in cash. Sessions 
lasted in total for a bit less than two hours, including payment. At the end of each session, 
the accumulated period profits in tokens were converted into euro at the pre-announced 
rate. Average earnings were € 33.47 per subject, which breaks down into € 5.59 for part 1 
(the Ring test) and € 27.88 for part 2 (the main experiment). 
 
3. Results 
We first provide a descriptive overview of our results regarding voting (in section 
3.1.1) and contributions (section 3.1.2) and then proceed with more detailed regression 
analyses and non-parametric tests (section 3.2). 
 
3.1 Descriptive overview of results 
3.1.1 Voting 
Table 2 provides an overview of some key outcomes by treatment. Beginning with 
the votes that subjects cast for the distribution parameter α, we see that as predicted the 
preferred  α tended to be lower for low than for high endowment subjects, with the 
average value voted for by middle endowment subjects lying in between. This tendency 
to vote differently depending on endowment is associated with statistically significant 
differences, as shown by Kruskal-Wallis tests and pairwise Mann-Whitney U tests (all 
with p < 0.001). The averages in Table 2 and the corresponding Figure 1 show, in line 
with our prediction in Hn.2, that low endowment subjects clearly did not always vote for 
  17α of 0.3, α of 0 being in fact their modal choice, and with their average vote for α being a 
little greater than 0.3 in QV, and a little less than 0.2 in RV. High endowment subjects 
sometimes voted for α < 1, a result more consistent with Hb.1 than with Hn.2. The higher 
average  α voted for by low and high endowment subjects when endowments were 
determined by quiz than when they are random are consistent with the presence of 
inequality aversion for random endowments and with a sense of legitimacy of earned 
inequalities in QV, as anticipated in Hb.1. Middle subjects’ votes, while roughly 
consistent with voting randomly over the 0.3 ≤  α  ≤ 1 range especially in the QV 
treatment, are for higher rather than lower α’s when endowments are random, contrary to 
Hb.1. The middle subject turned out to be the median voter (sometimes tied with another 
group member) in 2/3 of all votes in QV and in 76.1% of votes in RV, largely but not 
entirely in line with hypothesis Hn.2.
11 
 
Insert Table 2 and Figure 1 around here 
 
Figure 1 shows the relative frequency of votes for each possible value of α. We note 
both for treatment QV and RV a strong difference between low, median and high 
endowment subjects. Low endowment subjects vote in both treatments in the majority of 
cases for α  0.2, with the modal choice being α = 0. In general, low endowment subjects 
on average cast their vote as if they view inequality that disfavors them as being more 
acceptable when it is the result of performance (in QV) than pure luck (in RV). 
                                                 
11 In other words, Hn.2 is supported with respect to middle endowment subjects being the median voters 
between 2/3 and 3/4 of the time. This does not contradict the behavioral hypotheses on voting, which also 
permit the middle endowment subject to be the median voter if tastes for equality or equity are not too 
strong. However, the behavioral hypotheses can explain some of the departures, for example a low (high) 
endowment subject with strong sense of equity (preference for equality) could vote for a higher (lower) α 
than a middle endowment subject who is simply maximizing his income and thus selecting α randomly in 
the 0.3 to 1.0 range. Ties were most often with high endowment subjects: in 144 out of 360 decisions, the 
high and middle subjects concurred on the same α (usually 1); in 30 decisions, the high and low 
endowment subjects concurred; in 21 cases, the middle and low concurred; and in 16 cases, all three 
concurred. 
  18High endowment subjects have a clear preference for α = 1 (receiving 87% of their 
votes in QV and 78% in RV). However, they cast 11% (18%) of votes in QV (RV) in the 
range 0.3  α  0.9, supporting Hb.1’s prediction both of some high endowment subjects 
voting for α < 1 and for more of this in RV (p = 0.027, ²-test). 
For middle endowment subjects, α = 1 is also the modal choice, accounting for 43% 
(59%) of votes in QV (RV). This frequency of middle subjects’ votes for α = 1 is at odds 
with the Hn.2 prediction that they would randomize votes over the 0.3 to 1.0 range (even 
though than more than 80% of votes are in this range) and suggests instead a concern 




In Table 2 and in much of our discussion we do not report absolute contribution Ci 
but proportions of endowment contributed, Ci/Ei, which aids comparability across 
endowment levels. On average, subjects contributed to their group project the large 
majority of their tokens, ranging from 82.8% of their endowments in the QE treatment to 
88.4% in the RE treatment. These contribution averages are not far from what would be 
expected had behaviors adhered to Hn.1, with subjects contributing their full endowments 
or zero depending on whether α is smaller or larger than 0.25. Given that we have α < 
0.25 in 12.5% of periods and α > 0.25 in 87.5% of periods, Ci/Ei would have been 87.5% 
on average had all subjects behaved as predicted by Hn.1. We will see shortly, however, 
that actual contributions vary almost continuously as α varies. 
The last three rows of Table 2 report average Ci/Ei separated not by endowment but 
rather by the range in which the group’s median incentive parameter α lies. We report 
average Ci/Ei during periods in which α < 0.25 (VCM incentives), average Ci/Ei when 0.3 
≤ α ≤ 0.6 (in theory high enough to induce full contributions but possibly inducing lower 
contributions either due to a continuous response to incentives associated with bounded 
rationality, or to high contributors’ resistance to “unfair” sharing, or both), and lastly 
average Ci/Ei during periods in which 0.7 ≤ α ≤ 1 (a range of strongest incentives from a 
behavioral perspective to contribute the entire endowment). For each treatment, the 
average proportion contributed is substantially above 0 even if α < 0.25, and it rises as the 
  19range of α does, demonstrating that contributions respond more smoothly to incentive 
changes (see also Figure A.1 in Appendix A). In the VCM range (α < 0.25) average 
contributions are far lower in the QV and QE  treatments than in the RV and RE 
treatments, consistent with greater willingness to contribute despite low incentives when 
inequality is viewed as arbitrary. The difference is more pronounced in the treatments 
with exogenous endowments (i.e., the QE vs. RE comparison), suggesting that it is not 
mainly attributable to the desire to influence voting.
12 
 
3.2 Regression analyses and further results 
For a more nuanced view of the determinants of voting and of how contributions 
are affected by the distribution parameter in different treatments and for subjects having 
different endowments, it is helpful to simultaneously control for several variables using 
multivariate regressions, although the usual caveats regarding independence of 
observations need to be kept in mind. 
When studying voting and contribution decisions a potential endogeneity bias arises 
in regressions that study the two types of decisions separately. However, applying a 
2SLS/IV strategy is also problematic because the value of α that affects decisions in the 
contribution stage is determined in the voting stage by a subset of subjects only, namely 
those voting for the median value. In the following, we therefore discuss separate 
estimates, first considering the determinants of the contribution choice (in section 3.2.1) 
and then the determinants of the voting decision (section 3.2.2). We check for potential 
problems that arise from endogeneity issues by estimating 2SLS models for the relevant 
sample, but reserve results for an appendix. It is comforting to note that the estimated 
2SLS models cannot reject the exogeneity of α as a determinant of contributions at 
anything approaching conventional levels (see Appendix B). In addition to regression 
analyses, each of the following sub-sections also reports further non-parametric testing of 
hypotheses relating to its topic. 
                                                 
12 The overall difference between contributions in the quiz and in the exogenous endowment treatments is 
highly significant (Mann-Whitney-U-test, p < 0.001). Similar differences appear when comparing QV to 
RV and QE to RE separately, but the first difference is statistically insignificant while the second is 
significant at the 5% level. 
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3.2.1 Contribution decisions 
Table 3 shows four regression models attempting to explain the proportion of 
endowment that subjects contribute as a function of the current value of α, its square, 
dummy variables denoting low and middle endowment subjects (with the high 
endowment subjects being the reference group), a dummy variable for quiz-determined 
endowments (Quiz), a dummy for voted (as opposed to exogenous) α (Vote), a period 
trend term, lagged Ci/Ei, and interactions of the low and middle endowment dummies 
with α, Quiz, and Vote, to allow for the possibility that their effects differ by endowment. 
Columns (1) and (2) differ with respect to inclusion or not of group fixed effects. The 
estimates for both specifications show Ci/Ei to be significantly increasing in α, indicating 
once more that contributions respond in a continuous fashion to α, instead of jumping 
from zero to full endowment at α = 0.25.
13 Coefficients on α
2 are negative, suggesting 
concavity, but not consistently significant. Ci/Ei does not appear to vary significantly for 
the two distinguished endowments or their interaction with α. The coefficients on the 
Quiz-dummy are negative and significant, indicating that contributions are significantly 
smaller when endowments are determined by performance, an effect that seems not to 
differ by endowment (see the interaction terms). Determination of α by vote affects Ci/Ei 
positively, although this effect seems lessened or even reversed for middle endowment 
subjects. Not surprisingly, there is significant persistence of individual contributions, 
ceteris paribus. There is no indication of a time trend in contributions. 
 
Insert Table 3 around here 
 
The regressions in columns (3) and (4) add interaction terms between the treatment 
dummy variables (Quiz and Vote) and a dummy for observations in which α < 0.8.
14 The 
                                                 
13 To show this more formally, we estimated Table 3’s regressions using an α ≥ 0.3-dummy variable in 
place of or in addition to the variables α and α
2, finding that the fit is superior (judged, for example, by the 
R-squared and the Akaike information criterion) when using either α and α
2 or α alone than when using the 
cut-off dummy. 
14 Interactions between the treatment dummies and the endowment dummies are omitted in column (4). 
  21first of the new interaction terms returns highly significant negative coefficients, 
indicating that the negative impact of Quiz on proportion contributed was about twice as 
large when α was low. This suggests that a major reason why quiz-based endowments 
caused lower contributions is that more subjects found lower, redistributive values of α 
unacceptable when differences in endowment were “earned.”
15 But since the coefficient 
on  Quiz remains significant even when this interaction term is included, protest or 
resentment of redistribution cannot be the only explanation. The interaction between Vote 
and low α is insignificant, providing no direct support for the idea that subjects contribute 
less when there is voting in order to prompt votes for higher values of α. 
 
Do low endowment subjects signal that they don’t require incentives? 
Hb.3 suggests that in order to encourage others to vote for low values of α, low 
endowment subjects will contribute in spite of weak or absent monetary incentives. We 
test this hypothesis by investigating whether, for given low values of α, low endowment 
subjects contribute more in a treatment with endogenously chosen α t h a n  i n  a  
corresponding treatment in which α’s value is set exogenously. Our design allows us to 
match up each observation for a low endowment subject in treatment RV with a 
corresponding observation for the unique treatment RE-subject having exactly the same 
history of values of α up to the same period, and to likewise match each QV observation 
with a unique corresponding observation from the QE treatment. We then perform a 
Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-test of the difference in Ci/Ei (equivalently Ci, since we look only 
at subjects with Ei = 5). Because there are relatively few observations for which α = 0, 0.1 
or 0.2, we expand the set of “low α”-observations to include all in which α ≤ 0.5.
16 
Observations for the final period are excluded, since strategic incentives would be absent 
when choosing Ci at that point. 
When the paired observations of both pairs of treatments are pooled, the test finds 
no significant difference between the contributions in the treatment with voting and those 
in the treatment with exogenous α. However, Hb.3 predicts a stronger effect in the 
                                                 
15 Hb.1 deals with the effect of this judgment on voting, while Hb.2 is consistent with the effect seen for 
contributions but deals explicitly with high endowment subjects only. 
16 There are a total of 60 cases of α ≤ 0.2 in the four treatments versus 176 cases of α ≤ 0.5. 
  22treatments with random endowments, because low endowment subjects in the Quiz 
treatments might have reservations about “pushing for” lower values of α when 
endowments are viewed as earned and inequality is accordingly considered more “fair.” 
Therefore, we also test only the paired RV and RE observations for subjects with the low 
endowment. We find that RV subjects contributed significantly more than RE subjects at 
given low values of α (for periods 1–14, p < 0.05). Thus, in the two treatments in which a 
stronger effect is predicted, the data support Hb.3. 
 
Do high endowment subjects signal demands for higher α by withholding contributions in 
voting treatments? 
High endowment subjects may have contributed less when α was low (0.3 or just 
above) than when it was high (1.0 or close to 1.0), partly due to the same behavioral 
responsiveness to marginal incentives exhibited by other subjects. We can check whether 
high endowment subjects strategically contributed less at low values of α so as to induce 
others to vote for higher α by comparing their contribution levels when α was low but 
still high enough to make full contributions rational, say 0.3 ≤ α ≤ 0.7, in treatments with 
voting and in those without. Hb.2 implies that in this range and especially in early 
periods, high endowment subjects’ contributions will be lower in RV than in RE. The 
difference will be even stronger for QV versus QE if subjects feel more entitled to higher 
earnings when their endowments were attributable to their performance. Contrary to this 
hypothesis, Wilcoxon matched pair tests find that high endowment subjects contributed 
more in the two voting than in the two non-voting treatments in given periods and at 
given values of α in the 0.3 to 0.7 range (p < 0.01). Moreover, the difference is entirely 
attributable to the pair of treatments with quiz-based endowments: contributions by high 
endowment subjects are higher in QV than in QE (p < 0.01; Wilcoxon matched pair test), 
whereas the contribution difference between RV and RE taken alone is not significant. It 
would appear that high endowment subjects consider low α unfair and thus withhold 
contributions out of dissatisfaction and not necessarily out of desire to influence future 
votes. The finding that contributions in the low α-range are higher in QV than in QE 
might, on the contrary, even be attributable to the high endowment subjects considering 
  23low α-values to be less unfair when they have been chosen democratically than when 
they are exogenously imposed. 
 
Effects of gender and cooperativeness 
In our theoretical discussion, including that of Hb.2 and Hb.3, we hypothesized that 
behavior might differ depending on subjects’ degrees of inequality aversion, an 
individual preference parameter. To explore this issue, we investigate the impact of two 
individual characteristics—gender, and Cooperativeness (Coop), a measure constructed 
from the Ring-test decisions (see Appendix D for details). Table 4 presents a series of 
regressions explaining share of endowment contributed using the same explanatory 
variables as in the regressions of Table 3 but adding a Female dummy and/or the variable 
Coop, and in some specifications their interactions with the prevailing α. In the regression 
of column (1) we add Female only and find that it obtains a significant negative 
coefficient. When we add also an interaction between Female and α, in column (2), 
however, the sign on Female switches and there is a highly significant negative 
coefficient on the interaction term. The idea that females contribute less than males that is 
conveyed by regression (1) thus appears to be mainly attributable to the fact that female 
subjects contribute more when α is low but are significantly less responsive to increases 
in this incentive measure.
17 
 
Insert Table 4 around here 
 
Column (3)’s specification adds only Coop, which does not obtain a significant 
coefficient. When both Coop and its interaction with α are entered, in column (4), the 
Ring-test measure of cooperativeness seems to correctly identify a propensity to 
contribute to a public good, along with a relative insensitivity to the strength of the 
individual incentive. Finally, when all four variables are included in column (5), we see 
that the effects shown in columns (2) and (4) continue to hold but are strengthened in 
                                                 
17 Note that the negative coefficient on the interaction term is still considerably smaller than the positive 
coefficient on α itself. Hence female subjects are somewhat responsive to incentives, just less so than males 
are. 
  24both magnitude and significance. Thus, Female and Coop appear to capture individual 
preference-related characteristics that are predictive of higher contributions and lower 
responsiveness to monetary incentives but that are rather distinct.
18 Note finally that all 
our previous results remain stable after adding the two variables. 
 
3.2.2 Regression analysis and further tests of voting choices 
When analyzing voting on α in the QV and RV treatments, we consider two factors 
influencing own earnings and one that might influence the vote by way of social or other-
regarding concerns. Assume subject i votes so as to maximize  
)) , E ( , ( i Q y f U i i i  S   (2) 
where yi is i’s earnings for the period, as given in (1’), and Si reflects i’s social or other-
regarding preference for equality and equity and is permitted to vary depending on i’s 
endowment Ei and on whether endowment was earned (Q = 1) or randomly assigned (Q = 
0). Si is an individual-specific function which might be predictable on the basis of i’s 
gender and background characteristics or i’s behavior in other contexts. For simplicity, 
we rewrite (2) as an additive function of i’s income and i’s social preferences. 
) , E ( ) ( i Q y E EU i i i  S    (2’) 
We focus first on the effects of α on i’s income. Mathematically, the effect of α on 
yi decomposes into two terms, making 
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The first argument of g is the marginal effect of α on yi taking the contributions of each 
subject as given, and the second is the marginal effect of α on yi acting through its effect 
on the other group members’ contributions.
19  i i i C C y    ,   and  i i C y      are 
                                                 
18 Indeed, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between Female and Coop is -0.179 (p<0.001) for the 
full sample for which there are valid observations for Coop.  
19 The impact of changing α on i’s income through a change in i’s own contribution is ignored by virtue of 
the usual envelope argument. 
  25immediately calculable at observed C-i values using (1')
20, while a subject can form 
expectations of  ) (    i C E by observing impacts of changing α on group-mates’ 
contributions up to the time of a given vote.
21 Assuming a first-order condition that can 
be linearized in the arguments of (2"), we adopt as the core of our estimating equation: 
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where   is the value of α for which subject i votes in period t. On the right hand side 
(RHS), the term multiplying coefficient b0 is the expression for 
it
v
i i i C C y    ,  . To 
implement the second RHS term, we need an assumption about how subject i forms an 
expectation of ∂C-i/∂α in period t. We assume that i calculates a weighted average of past 
observed changes in others’ contributions in her group, placing greater weight on more 
recent changes because she assumes that others’ reactions may be evolving with 
experience, because she remembers more clearly more recent changes, or for some 
combination of the two reasons.  Specifically, we set 
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where Δmax is the maximum possible value of ΔC-i/Δα, d ≥ 0 is the backward discounting 
rate for past observations, and the term in curled brackets is thus the weighted average 
proportion of the maximum possible change in contributions that i has observed.
22 
                                                 
20 
i i i i i C C C C y       ) 3 2 ( ) 3 4 ( ,   and  ) 1 ( 3 2     i i C y . 
21 Recall that according to standard theory, ∂C-i/∂α = 0 everywhere except at α = 0.25, where it is infinite. 
Expectations of realistic ∂C-i/∂α values, which are neither 0 nor infinite, are therefore based on observed 
behavior, not on theory. 
22 Δmax = 250, 200 and 150 for low, middle and high endowment subjects, respectively, since the smallest 
possible change in α is 0.1 and the largest possible change in C is 5, 10 and 15 for the three endowment 
types, in the same order. We adopt the ratio form in the curled brackets in (4) so that the backward 
discounted sum of past ΔCi/Δα observations does not grow larger simply because more past periods are 
included (with each added term in the numerator, the maximum value of the change in the same period is 
added to the denominator). To deal with those adjacent periods τ and τ-1 in which α is unchanged in a given 
group, we (a) treat ΔCi/Δα as 0 in any period prior to the earliest observed change of α in a group, (b) treat 
ΔC-i/Δα as 0 in the most recent of a series of adjacent periods without change of α, and (c ) for any adjacent 
periods without change of α for which there are observations of ΔCi/Δα in earlier and later pairs of periods 
(including a later 0 imposed due to (b)), we set ΔCi/Δα by linear interpolation of those values. 
  26Equation (3) is estimated inserting values of (4) calculated using alternative values of d, 
and we then select the best-fitting value by means of the Akaike and Schwarz information 
criteria. The full expression that coefficient b1 multiplies includes  ) 1 )( 3 2 (   , which is 
i i C y     of equation (2''). To simplify the discussion of our estimates, we refer to the 
purely distributive term multiplied by b0 as the “distributive effect” and to the term 
measuring α’s effect on i’s income through changes in others’ contributions—which has 
coefficient b1—as the “incentive effect.” In our regressions, we allow for differences in 
the incentive effect at different endowment levels by including interactions with low and 
high endowment dummy variables, but we omit such interactions for the distributive 
effect because its structure already incorporates contribution terms and is thus in practice 
highly correlated with endowment.  
With respect to the social preference portion of (2'')— ) , E ( i Q i  S —we control for 
the possibility that subjects view redistribution as less fair when endowments are earned 
via quiz performance by including a dummy variable for our QV treatment, Quiz, as well 
as two endowment dummy interactions. We also investigate possible social preferences 
by including in some specifications Female or Female and Coop dummy variables. We 
include free-standing dummy variables for two endowment levels to check whether 
endowment levels have effects not captured by the other terms. A time trend is also 
included, as are group fixed effects. Finally, εit is an error term. Our prediction 
corresponds to b0 > 0, b1 > 0 and b2 > 0.  
Table 5 displays the results of the regression estimates using best-fitting d = 1.4 
as determined in the simplest specification, that of column (1). That column’s result 
supports our predictions with significant positive coefficients on the distributive and 
incentive effects, although the latter is effectively zero for middle endowment subjects, 
considering the interaction term. The quiz (or ‘earned endowment’) treatment effect is 
insignificant for high endowment subjects, weakly significant and negative for middle 
endowment subjects, and highly significant and positive for those with low endowment. 
Hence, our prediction regarding b2 is supported for the latter only. Low endowment as 
such has a large and significant negative effect on the vote for α, while the coefficient on 
middle endowment is small and quite insignificant after controlling for the other effects, 
  27indicating no difference with high endowment subjects except via interactions with the 
incentive and treatment effects. There is a significant positive coefficient on Period, 
indicating an economically small upward trend. 
 
Insert Table 5 around here 
Test classification Coop is included, in 
column
to Hb.1—more inclined to 




                                                
 
The results in columns (2) and (3), which add Female and Coop dummies, are 
qualitatively similar for the other variables except that the incentive effect becomes 
insignificant for low endowment subjects in column (3), and there is a significant positive 
effect of Quiz for high in addition to low endowment subjects in specification (3), an 
additional success for our prediction regarding b2. The new results also provide support 
for the idea that individual preferences matter to voting. In particular, female subjects 
appear to favor significantly more equal distribution, after controlling for other factors, in 
specification (2). However, when the Ring 
 (3), only it is significant and negative. 
In sum, our regressions based on equation (3) suggest that subjects’ votes on the 
distribution parameter were significantly influenced by its direct effect on their own 
earnings (distributive effect), while its predicted effect via its influence on others’ 
contributions (incentive effect) is significant for high and possibly low but not middle 
endowment subjects. Even after controlling for the distributive effect, low endowment 
subjects favor more redistribution, but their zeal in this regard is significantly reduced 
when endowments were earned by quiz performance, an indication of respect for earned 
inequalities. Only middle endowment subjects are—contrary 
 
23 Conceivably, “sour grapes” are at work: some runner-up middle subjects might believe that they came 
very close and were denied the prized high position by chance and thus unfairly.  In contrast, few or no low 
subjects may doubt that the high and middle ones performed better on the quiz. 
  284. Discussion and conclusion 
We introduce a new experimental design to study the struggle between equality, 
equity and the need for incentives, one of the most important sets of trade-offs in 
economic life. Our framework can be applied to the general question regarding the trade-
off between equality and incentives that every society has to answer through decisions on 
taxes and redistribution, but it can, for instance, also be applied to the question of optimal 
incentives for work teams. Our new design nests the voluntary contribution mechanism in 
a more variable incentive model and makes incentive settings endogenous. By adding 
only slightly more complexity to one of the most familiar games in the literature of 
experimental economics, we get a much richer framework that is able to answer a broader 
class of questions than the standard public goods game. 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: First, high and low endowment 
subjects’ votes are largely (although not entirely) predictable from self-interest, with the 
former mostly favoring payment proportionate to contributions and the latter favoring 
more equal payment. 
Second, despite the important role of self-interested behavior, there are significant 
signs of preferences for both equality and equity. In particular, subjects display greater 
preference for equality when inequalities are arbitrary than when they are earned by task 
performance, since low and high endowment subjects are observed to vote for more 
equality if endowments were not earned. This is clear evidence that subjects distinguish 
between the concepts of equality and equity when the predictions based on them are not 
the same. Moreover, female subjects and those scored as more cooperative, based on a 
Ring-test, contribute more unconditionally, are less responsive to incentives, and show a 
preference for greater equality in their voting on the division parameter. It is also 
important that subjects in our experiment select an incentive setting that reduces 
inequality by 22%, on average, relative to the inequality of their endowments and of a 
distribution in proportion to inputs. By and large this figure does not seem to be far from 
the extent of redistribution that we observe in modern industrial capitalist societies 
(Milanovic, 2000). 
Third, there is evidence that low endowment subjects’ contributions are influenced 
by strategic considerations: low endowment subjects contribute more when the marginal 
  29return is less than one if the division is determined by vote (presumably to signal 
willingness to cooperate despite low incentive) than when the same division parameters 
arise exogenously. High endowment subjects influence groups’ choices of the division 
parameter by withholding contributions when it is relatively low, even though 
contributing the full endowment maximizes their immediate payoff. However, the 
withholding of contributions by high endowment subjects may be more a response to 
perceived unfairness than a conscious attempt to influence votes, since there is actually 
less such behavior in groups with voting. 
Finally, subjects respond to the strength of incentives in a roughly continuous 
fashion, rather than jumping from zero contributions when their marginal return for 
contributing is below unity to full contributions when it exceeds that threshold, as 
standard theory would predict. 
With respect to the hypotheses laid out in our theoretical predictions section, our 
results, while partly consistent with conventional predictions Hn.1 and Hn.2, were 
generally more consistent with behavioral predictions Hb.1 – Hb.3. The main exceptions 
are Hb.1’s prediction regarding voting by middle endowment subjects and Hb.2’s 
prediction of more strategic withholding of contributions by high endowment subjects at 
low α values in voting than in non-voting treatments. 
Our setup provides a straightforward way of using the experimental laboratory to 
study one of the most important questions of economics. The evidence we present shows 
that self-interest, other-regarding preferences and strategic considerations all play major 
roles in determining behavior. While subjects vote mainly in line with self-interest, many 
show dislike of inequality.  Consistent with Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Bénabou 
and Tirole (2006), the degree of redistribution is sensitive to the perceived fairness of 
inequalities.  We find the richer members of our mini-societies influencing decisions on 
redistribution by holding back on effort. And the democratic process in our endogenous 
treatments lead to results broadly in line with what we observe in real societies.  
In addition to the macroeconomic implications of our experiment, there are some 
further lessons to be drawn for the design of actual institutions. One is that continuous 
rather than dichotomous response to the incentive parameter suggests that organizations 
considering an element of reward-sharing, for instance to foster helping behaviors among 
  30workers, can anticipate smaller responses of changes in marginal rewards than standard 
theory predicts. Another implication, most relevant to cooperatives and other 
intentionally solidaristic organizations, is that the desires of some team members to 
reduce inequalities as an end in itself means that maximization of joint utility and of joint 
money payoffs call for different choices along the spectrum of incentives versus equality. 
Because people are fairly mobile among organizations, the macro-political 
economic implications of our experiment may be even more important than are the micro 
ones, despite the tiny size of our experimental “societies”. Even though our design makes 
the presence of fairness preferences and incentive considerations more transparent by 
making the immediate interest of the likely median voters a neutral one, an interesting 
extension would be to mimic the right-skewedness of real world income distributions by 
starting with an asymmetric distribution of endowments—5, 8, 15, say, rather than the 5, 
10, 15 of the current design—in which case we should expect to see somewhat more 
redistribution prevail. One suggestion that might be drawn from the deleterious effect of 
such redistribution on incentives is that a more equal initial distribution of skills and other 
assets, which can be fostered by education and tax policies, among others, could provide 
a foundation for a more prosperous society. 
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Table 1: Treatments, groups and subjects in the experiment 









































  39Table 2. Summary statistics on votes and contributions (standard deviations in brackets) 
Voted α Exogenous  α 
Treatment / 














(0.430)  n/a n/a 




(0.307)  n/a n/a 




(0.330)  n/a n/a 











































































  40Table 3. Determinants of the proportion of endowment contributed I 
Dependent variable: Ci/Ei 
  (1) (2) 





























































Fixed effects  No  Group 
No. of observations  2016  2016 
R squared  0.345  0.392 
Prob. > F  0.000  0.000 
Coefficient robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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  (3) (4) 





































Quiz*Low  0.007 
(0.022) 
- 
Quiz*Middle  -0.001 
(0.021) 
- 




Vote*Low  -0.027 
(0.023) 
- 
Vote*Middle  -0.048 ** 
(0.021) 
- 












Fixed effects  Group  Group 
No. of observations  2016  2016 
R squared  0.402  0.400 
Prob. > F  0.000  0.000 
Coefficient robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  42Table 4. Determinants of the proportion of endowment contributed II 
Dependent variable: Ci/Ei 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

















































































































































- -  0.135  *** 
(0.044) 
α*Female  - -0.124  *** 
(0.047) 
- -  -0.186  *** 
(0.050) 




















N  2016 2016 1680 1680 1680 
R  squared  0.394 0.398 0.409 0.414 0.424 
Prob.>F  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OLS regressions with group fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. 
  43Table 5. Determinants of the vote for α 
OLS regressions with group fixed effects. Dependent variable: α 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
































































Coop  - -  -0.066  ** 
(0.030) 







2 0.491  0.498  0.561 
N 855  855  737 
p [incentive+inc_low=0]  0.061  0.078  0.394 
p [incentive+inc_middle=0]  0.355  0.547  0.770 
p [quiz+quiz_low=0]  0.001  0.001  0.000 





  44Appendix A: Additional results 
 
Table A.1. Votes for α by endowment 
Endowment  Total 
  5  10  15   
0.0  192  45 10 247 
0.1  29  6 2 37 
0.2  7  5 1 13 
0.3  2  7 0 9 
0.4  8  5 2 15 
0.5  34  39 14 87 
0.6  4  10 4 18 
0.7  14  14 3 31 
0.8  15  31 8 54 
0.9  11  14 20 45 
α 
1.0  44  184 296 524 
Mean  .287  .729 .925 .647 
Total  360  360 360 1080 
 
Figure A.1 
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Appendix B: 2SLS/Instrumental variable estimations 
 
We estimate two-stage least squares models where the value of α in the equation for 
contributions is predicted by a first-stage regression in which the incentive and 
distributive effect variables serve as instruments. The main difficulty here is that about 
half of contribution decisions were made by subjects who had not voted for the value of α 
that determines their incentive, so including first-stage regressions resembling those in 
Table 5 is inappropriate for such subjects. A feasible albeit imperfect solution is to 
estimate 2SLS regressions using only observations of individuals who had voted for the 
median α in the period in question.
24 This turns out to be 57% of all observations, owing 
to the substantial number of cases in which two or even three group members selected the 
same  α. Even so, with observations from the RE and QE treatments (in which α is 
exogenous) also excluded, our 2SLS estimates are based on far fewer observations than 
are those of Table 3 (461 versus 2016, or less than 23%). Any comparison between the 
contribution regressions discussed in the text and our 2nd stage IV estimates must 
accordingly be done with caution. 
We show three sets of 2SLS regressions that vary with respect to the inclusion or 
not in the 1st stage regression of two sets of interaction terms, those between endowment 
dummy variables and the incentive effect, and those between the same dummies and 
Quiz. In the new 1st stage regressions, corresponding roughly to the ones shown in Table 
5, the positive and highly significant coefficient on the distributive effect is confirmed, 
and the effect of Quiz is positive and significant, with specification (3) suggesting that 
this is especially attributable to the reactions of low endowment subjects. The coefficients 
on the incentive effect are insignificant except in the no interaction specification, and 
there is a marginally significant coefficient for the interaction with the low endowment 
dummy in specification (3). In both cases, the incentive variable has the “wrong” sign. 
                                                 
24 Another conceivable approach would be to include both the α that a given subject voted for, treated as 
endogenous, and the median α that prevails for the group, treated as exogenous, in the 2nd-stage 
regressions. But this is infeasible because of the very high correlation between self-voted and median α, 
which is even identical for many observations. 
  46The result seems unsurprising in view of the facts that the predicted incentive effect also 
failed to hold for middle endowment subjects in Table 5 and that it is middle subjects 
who account for the bulk of the median voter observations used in this exercise. The 
Female and Coop dummies are omitted since neither is significant when included. 
Because these results are equivalent to OLS estimates for the subsample who vote for 
median  α in a given period, differences with Table 5 must be attributed to sample 
selection (including the aforementioned oversampling of middle subjects), not the 2SLS 
setting. 
It is in the 2nd stage regressions for contributions that differences attributable to the 
endogeneity of α could potentially appear. Table A.3 shows three versions of the 
regression which differ only with respect to the 1st stage variants used to predict α, these 
being the three regressions of Table A.2, with the same order maintained. Because the 
square of the predicted α, the endowment dummies, and all interaction terms involving 
those dummies turn out to be insignificant, they are dropped from these specifications. 
The Hansen J-statistics reported at the bottom of the table indicate that the instruments 
included in the 1st stage regressions pass the over-identification tests comfortably.
25 
However, the Wu-Hausman tests of weak instruments return F-statistics having p-values 
of about 0.7, far too high to reject the hypothesis that α is after all exogenous. The 
predicted α variable obtains highly significant positive coefficients, further allaying any 
concern that the effect of this parameter on contributions found in previous regressions 
was due to endogeneity bias. Interestingly, the coefficients on Quiz, which are negative 
and significant at the 5% level in Table 3, are positive and significant at the 10% level in 
its 2SLS counterparts. However, when we estimate an OLS version of the same 
contributions regression shown in Table A.3 for the same subset of observations, it turns 
out that Quiz has a significant positive coefficient in it as well, so that the difference is 
again attributable to the difference in sample, not to failure to account for the endogeneity 
of α. 
                                                 
25 Comparing Tables A.2 and A.3 shows that in the first equation system, only the distributive and incentive 
effect variables serve as instruments, while in the second and third equations there are additional interaction 
terms included in the first but not second stages and therefore also playing the role of instruments. 
  47Table A.2. Determinants of the vote for α (2SLS) 
 
Dependent variable: α 
  (1) (2)  (3) 
































Quiz*Low  - -  0.164  ** 
(0.080) 
Quiz*Middle  - -  0.008 
(0.046) 












No. of observations  461  461  461 
R squared  0.146  0.149  0.162 
Prob. > F  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Coefficient robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 











Table A.3. Determinants for the proportion of endowment contributed (2SLS) 
 
Dependent variable: Ci/Ei 
  (1) (2)  (3) 






























No. of observations  461  461  461 
R squared  0.305  0.305  0.307 
Hansen J statistic (overid. test)  0.869  1.167  3.317 
Chi-sq(1) P-value  0.351  0.761  0.651 
Wu-Hausman F statistic 
(endogeneity test)  0.180 0.200  0.107 
F (1, 455) P-value  0.671  0.655  0.744 
Instrumented: α 
Coefficient robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level respectively. 
 
  
  49Appendix C: Instructions for treatment QV
26 
 
Welcome to an experiment on decision-making. Thank you for participating! During the 
experiment you will be asked to make decisions and so will the other participants. Your 
decisions, as well as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your monetary 
payoff according to the rules that will be explained shortly. 
 
As is standard in such experiments, communication of any kind with other participants is 
prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment. If you have 
any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters 
will come to assist you. 
 
The experiment is computerized and will last for approximately two hours. Decisions will 
be made on your screen. All your decisions and answers to questions remain 
confidential and anonymous. We will use the identification tag that you have received 
on entering the room only to identify you when we pay you your income after the 
experiment. 
 
The experiment will consist of two parts. You will receive instructions on the relevant 
parts in turn. We will read the instructions aloud and, then, give time for you to ask 
questions. Please do not hesitate to ask if anything is unclear. Decisions in the two parts 
of the experiment are completely independent. 
 
Your income in the experiment will be in “tokens.” At the end of the experiment, tokens 




In Part I, all persons in the room will be randomly matched into pairs of two. Nobody 
will find out neither during nor after the experiment with whom he or she was connected. 
You will have to make 24 choices between two options, called Option A and Option B. 
Every option allocates a positive or negative number of tokens to your account and a 
positive or negative amount of tokens to the other person’s account. This other person 
answers exactly the same questions. Your total income from Part I depends on your 
decision and the decision of the other person in your pair. 
 
Example: 
  Option A  Option B 
Your payoff  10.00  7.00 
Other’s payoff  -5.00  4.00 
 
                                                 
26 The instructions for the other treatments are analogous. 
  50If you choose option A, you will receive 10 tokens and the other person will be deducted 
5 tokens. If the other person in your pair chooses option A too, then you will also receive 
a deduction of 5 tokens. In total you would have earned 5 tokens (10 tokens from your 
choice minus 5 tokens from the choice of the other person). 
In case you choose option B and the other person chooses option A, you will receive 2 
tokens (7 tokens from your own choice minus 5 tokens from the choice of the other 
person in your pair). The other person would have earned 14 tokens (10 tokens + 4 
tokens). 
 
Your total income from Part I will be determined as follows: Looking at your decisions, 
the values for “Your payoff” will be summed up. Looking at the person you are 
connected with, the values for “Other’s payoff” will be summed up. The sum of both 
sums determines your payoff and will be exchanged into euros according to the following 
exchange rate: 3 tokens = 1 euro. This exchange rate is only valid for Part I. 
 
You do not get any information on single decision of the person you are paired with, but 
you will be informed about the sum of payoffs. 
 






The tokens you earn in Part II will be exchanged into euros at the end of the experiment 
according to the following exchange rate: 10 tokens = 1 euro. 
 
All participants will be divided in groups of three members. You will not learn the 
identity of the other participants in your group. 
 
At the beginning of Part II 
At the outset you will be asked to answer 20 trivia questions. For each question, we will 
provide four answers, but only one of them is correct. The endowment that you will 
receive in each of the subsequent periods in Part II depends on the number of questions 
you answer correctly. Specifically, the group member within your group with the most 
correct answers will receive the highest endowment; the group member within your 
group with the second-most correct answers will receive the second-highest endowment 
and so on. Equal numbers of correct answers will be resolved by a random draw of the 
computer. Thus, there is always a strict ranking of endowments within your three-person 
group. 
 




                                                 
27 Handed out after completion of Part I. 
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correct answers) 
Endowment each period 
of Part II 
1  15 tokens 
2  10 tokens 
3  5 tokens 
 
The rank will also be your group member number. 
 
The basic decision situation 
You will learn later exactly how the experiment is conducted. We first introduce you to 
the basic decision situation. You will find control questions at the end of the description 
of the decision situation that help you to get a better understanding. 
As you know you will be a member of a group consisting of 3 people. In each period 
each group member has to decide on the allocation of his or her endowment. You can 
either invest your endowment into your private account or you can contribute them fully 
or partially to a project. Each token you do not contribute to the project will automatically 
remain in your private account. 
 
Your income from the private account each period 
You will earn one token for each token you put into your private account. For example, if 
you put 15 tokens into your private account, your income in this period will amount to 
exactly 15 tokens out of your private account. If you put 2 tokens into your private 
account, your income from this account will be 2 tokens for that period. No one except 
you earns something from your private account. 
 
Your income from the project each period 
Your income from the project depends on three things: (1) your contribution to the 
project, (2) the combined contribution to the project by all group members, and (3) a 
proportion x, between 0 and 1, which determines the weight placed on (1) versus (2). 
 
If  x = 1, only your own contribution to the project affects your project income; in 
particular, your project income is then 2·ci, where ci is your contribution. 
 
If x = 0, only the combined contribution affects your project income; in particular, your 
project income is then (2·C)/3, where C is the total contribution to the project by all 
members of your group, yourself included. 
 
If  x  is more than 0 but less than one, some weight is placed both on ci (or more 
specifically, on 2·ci) and on C (that is, on (2/3)·C). 
 







   +  i c x  2  . 
 
Your total income each period 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the 
project: 
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+ Income from the project 
= Sum of income each period 
 
Or, mathematically: 
) on contributi your  ( 2
) group your  in    ons contributi   all (
3
2
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where ei denotes your endowment. 
Remember: x is the weight placed on your contribution, (1-x) is the weight placed on the 




Please answer the following control questions. They will help you to gain an 
understanding of the calculation of your income, which varies with your decision about 
how you distribute your tokens. Please answer all the questions and write down your 
calculations. After that, please enter your answers on the screen. 
For the first set of questions, assume that x = 1 and that you are the second-ranked 
member of your group, i.e., your endowment is 10 tokens. 
 
1.  Assume that none of the three group members (including you) contributes anything 
to the project. 
What will your total income in tokens be? Your income  ___________ 
What will group Member 1’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
What will group Member 3’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
 
2.  You contribute 10 tokens to the project. The other members of the group contribute 
13, respectively 4 tokens to the project. 
What will your total income be? Your income  ___________ 
What will group Member 1’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
What will group Member 3’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
 
3.  The other two members contribute a total of 5 tokens to the project. 
a) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 0 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
b) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 5 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
c) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 10 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
 
4.  Assume that you contribute 5 tokens to the project. 
a)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 
tokens – contribute another 3 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ 
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kens – contribute another 10 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
c)  What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 tok-
ens – contribute another 20 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
 
 
For the second set of questions, assume that x = 0 and that you are again the second-
ranked member of your group, i.e., your endowment is 10 tokens. 
 
5.  Assume that none of the three group members (including you) contributes anything 
to the project. 
What will your total income in tokens be? Your income  ___________ 
What will group Member 1’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
What will group Member 3’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
 
6.  You contribute 10 tokens to the project. The other members of the group contribute 
13, respectively 4 tokens to the project. 
What will your total income be? Your income  ___________ 
What will group Member 1’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
What will group Member 3’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
 
7.  The other two members contribute a total of 10 tokens to the project. 
a) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 2 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
b) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 5 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
c) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 8 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
 
8.  Assume that you contribute 5 tokens to the project. 
a)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 
tokens – contribute another 4 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ 
b)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 to-
kens – contribute another 10 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
c)  What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 to-
kens – contribute another 19 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
 
 
For the third set of questions, assume that x = 0.5 and that you are again the second-
ranked member of your group, i.e., your endowment is 10 tokens. 
 
9.  Assume that none of the three group members (including you) contributes anything 
to the project. 
What will your total income in tokens be? Your income  ___________ 
What will group Member 1’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
What will group Member 3’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
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10.  You contribute 10 tokens to the project. The other members of the group contribute 
13, respectively 4 tokens to the project. 
What will your total income be? Your income  ___________ 
What will group Member 1’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
What will group Member 3’s total income in tokens be?  ___________ 
 
11.  The other two members contribute a total of 10 tokens to the project. 
a) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 2 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
b) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 5 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
c) What will your total income be, if you – in addition to the 10 tokens – 
contribute 8 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
 
12.  Assume that you contribute 5 tokens to the project. 
a)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 
tokens – contribute another 4 tokens to the project? Your Income ___________ 
b)  What is your total income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 to-
kens – contribute another 10 tokens to the project? Your Income  ___________ 
c)  What is your income if the other group members – in addition to your 5 to-




Each period in Part II consists of two phases, and there are a total of 15 such periods in 
Part II. After the trivia questions, you will learn your rank within your group (equal to 
your group member number) and your endowment. You will receive this endowment at 
the beginning of each period, and your rank will not change from period to period. 
 
Phase 1 – choice of x: 
Your group can choose the preferred x. You can choose from the following values of x: 
0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 1. Each group member will be asked to 
propose his or her preferred x. The median of these three proposals within your group 
will then be implemented and be valid for this period. 
Suppose the three proposals within your group are: 0.1, 0.2 and 0.3. The median proposal 
to be implemented would be 0.2. 
Suppose the three proposals within your group are: 0.9, 1 and 1. The median proposal to 
be implemented would be 1. 
Suppose the three proposals within your group are: 0.5, 0.6 and 0.6. The median proposal 
to be implemented would be 0.6. 
At the end of Phase 1 you will be informed about the relevant median proposal. 
 
Phase 2 – contribution decision: 
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contribute to the project. The rest of the individual endowment will be automatically 
invested into the private account. 
 
Your income for this period will be determined in the following way: 
 
Reminder 
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and that from the 
project: 
Income from your private account (= endowment – contribution to the project) 
+ Income from the project 
= Sum of income each period 
 
Or, mathematically: 
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At the end of each period, you will be informed about all individual contributions within 
your group (you will be able to link them to the Member numbers) and your period 
income in tokens as well as the individual period income in tokens of the other two 
members. 
 
Each of the 15 periods will be identical and will follow the protocol described above. 
You will be staying in the same group for the 15 periods, i.e., the two other group 




Your total income over the 15 periods will be converted to euro (at the exchange rate 10 
tokens = 1 €) and privately be paid to you at the end of the experiment. It will be added to 
the amount that you earned from Part I of the experiment.  
 
After Part II, we ask you to fill in a questionnaire. Please answer the questions frankly 
and seriously because they are very important for our research. Thereafter, the 
experiment ends. There will be no other parts or repetitions. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. We will come to your place to answer 
them privately. 
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The social orientation questionnaire consists of 24 choices (see Table A.4) between 
two own-other payoff allocations (the “decomposed game”) in constant, anonymous 
pairs. Each allocation assigns a given amount of experimental money to the subject 
herself, called own payoff x, and a certain amount of points to the matched player, called 
other payoff y. It was common knowledge that every subject received the same 
questionnaire. During the questionnaire players did not receive any feedback about the 
other player’s choices in order to avoid strategic considerations. The payoff allocations 
were constructed such that   holds. Hence, each allocation can be 
represented as a vector in a Cartesian plane which lies on a circle with radius r centred at 
the origin.  
        y x r
The payoff allocations are paired such that each choice consists of two adjacent 
vectors. If one assumes that a – yet unknown – motivational vector M

 exists, a subject 
will choose that allocation (vector) which is closer to M

. Based on a series of choices, 
therefore, it is possible to determine a subject’s “social motivation” with respect to 
weighing own payoffs (x) versus others payoffs (y) by adding up x and y separately 
across all choices and calculating the angle M of the resulting vector M

. By means of 
this angle subjects’ motivation can be classified as belonging to one of the following 
eight categories: individualism, altruism, cooperation, competition, martyrdom, 
masochism, sadomasochism, and aggression. 
In addition, the length of the motivational vector serves as a measure of 
consistency, i.e., whether the choices are taken such that the subject has always chosen 
that vector which is closest to the motivational vector. If a subject chooses consistently 
throughout the 24 choices, the length of the resulting vector would be 30. Random choice 
would result in a vector of zero length. 
In order to incentivize the procedure, subjects’ total payoffs from the series of 
choices were determined by the sum of choices made by the subject herself and by the 
choices of the paired player. 
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Table A.4. Ring-test – own-other payoff allocations 
  Option A    Option B 
Question number  self (x)  other (y)    self (x)  other (y) 
1 15  0    14.5  -3.9 
2 13  7.5    14.5  3.9 
3 7.5  -13    3.9  -14.5 
4 -13  -7.5    -14.5  -3.9 
5 -7.5  13    -3.9  14.5 
6 -10.6  -10.6    -13  -7.5 
7 3.9  14.5    7.5  13 
8 -14.5  -3.9    -15  0 
9 10.6  10.6    13  7.5 
10 14.5  -3.9    13  -7.5 
11 3.9  -14.5    0  -15 
12 14.5  3.9    15  0 
13 7.5  13    10.6  10.6 
14 -14.5  3.9    -13  7.5 
15 0  -15    -3.9  -14.5 
16 -10.6  10.6    -7.5  13 
17 -3.9  -14.5    -7.5  -13 
18 13  -7.5    10.6  -10.6 
19 0  15    3.9  14.5 
20 -15  0    -14.5  3.9 
21 -7.5  -13    -10.6  -10.6 
22 -13  7.5    -10.6  10.6 
23 -3.9  14.5    0  15 
24 10.6  -10.6    7.5  -13 
 
The classification of the subjects was accomplished by means of the angle of the 
motivational vector M

 (based on the vectors defining the basic social motivation; see 
Figure C1) Subjects with an angle M between 0° and 22.5° or 337.5° and 0° were 
classified as individualistic, subjects with an angle between 22.5° and 67.5° as 
cooperative. Further angles were: altruist (between 67.5° and 112.5°), martyrdom 
(between 112.5° and 157.5°), masochism (between 157.5° and 202.5°), sadomasochism 
  58(between 202.5° and 247.5°), aggression (between 247.5° and 292.5°), and competitive 
(between 292.5° and 337.5°), but they are very rarely observed in practice. To avoid 
examining subjects who made relatively inconsistent choices we included in the analysis 
only those subjects with a vector length of 15 (out of the maximal length of 30). 
 
Figure A.1. Vectors defining the basic social motivation 
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